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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The sales tax is dying on the vine. First adopted during the De-
pression in response to declining income and property tax revenues, 
the retail sales tax emerged during the second half of the 20th cen-
tury as one of the major revenue sources for state and local govern-
ments.1 According to the most recent Census of State and Local Gov-
ernments, sales taxes accounted for roughly thirty-six percent of all 
state and local tax revenues in 1996.2 In those states without an in-
dividual income tax, such as Texas and Florida, the sales tax is even 
more significant, accounting for an average of fifty-two percent of all 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I would like to thank J.D. DuRant for his 
substantive comments on an earlier draft, as well as his excellent editorial assistance. Any 
mistakes and omissions are my own. 
 1. John F. Due, The Evolution of Sales Taxation: 1915-1972, in MODERN FISCAL 
ISSUES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP 318 (Richard M. Bird & John G. Head eds., 
1972) (noting that “[i]n the fifty-five year period from 1917 to 1972 sales taxation has 
grown from obscurity to a major revenue source throughout most of the world”). 
 2. 4 U.S. DEP’T OF COM., COMPENDIUM OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES, 1997 CENSUS OF 
GOVERNMENTS 32, tbl.25 (1997), at http://www.census.gov/prod/gc97/gc974-5.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 24, 2003) (on file with author). The 1997 Census of Governments indicates that 
the property tax accounted for 30% of total state and local tax revenues, while the personal 
income tax accounted for 21.8% of total state and local tax revenues. The corporate income 
tax accounted for only 4.6% of total state and local tax revenues. Id. 
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state and local taxes.3 
 In recent years, however, the future of the sales tax has been 
clouded by several economic, legal, and technological developments. 
During the 1990s, popular and academic attention focused on the de-
velopment with perhaps the most obvious adverse effect on sales tax 
collections—i.e., the rise of electronic commerce.4 Historically, the 
sales tax has depended on the cooperation of local retailers who col-
lect the tax and remit it to the state. The rise of the internet has dis-
rupted this system by facilitating the purchase of goods from remote 
vendors with little or no connection to the taxing state. As consumer 
purchases have gradually shifted away from local bricks and mortar 
retailers to internet transactions,5 it has become harder and harder 
for states to collect taxes on those sales. 
 But while the e-commerce issue has taken center stage as the 
primary source of erosion in the sales tax base, there is another con-
cern for the future of the tax that is perhaps even more significant: 
the failure of the tax to reach most services. As originally crafted, the 
retail sales tax applied almost exclusively to the retail sale of tangi-
ble personal property.6 In the years following World War II, however, 
the U.S. economy has gradually shifted away from the production of 
tangible commodities and toward a greater emphasis on services. 
The data on U.S. personal consumption reveal an unmistakable 
trend. Whereas in 1950 services accounted for only 33% of total per-
sonal consumption, by 2000 that figure had jumped to 58%.7 As a re-
cent Federal Reserve study explains, “[t]he service sector dominates 
the U.S. economy. It makes up two-thirds of the nation’s output. 
Nearly four out of five Americans earn their livelihoods providing 
services . . . . Services is the economy’s fastest growing sector.”8 As a 
result of these tectonic shifts in the nature of economic activity, the 
                                                                                                                    
 3. Id. This excludes Alaska, which derives the bulk of its revenue from property 
taxes and severance taxes. Id. 
 4. There is an extensive literature on the effect of e-commerce on state/local sales 
taxes. For a useful overview of the issues, see Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation 
of Electronic Commerce: Reflections on the Emerging Issues, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 
(1998). 
 5. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY II (1999), at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lp53215/ede2.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
 6. Some states include in the sales tax base certain limited services, such as utilities 
and admissions to entertainment and sporting events. For a discussion, see infra Part II.B. 
 7. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NATIONAL INCOME AND 
PRODUCT ACCOUNTS TABLES tbl. 1.1, at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView 
Fixed.asp?SelectedTable=3&FirstYear=1999&LastYear=2000&Freq=Qtr (last revised Dec. 
20, 2002) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (on file with author). 
 8. W. Michael Cox & Richard Alm, The Service Sector: Give it Some Respect, in FED. 
RES. BANK OF DALLAS: ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1994), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/ 
htm/pubs/pdfs/anreport/arpt94.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with author). 
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retail sales tax reaches a smaller and smaller portion of gross domes-
tic product each year.9 
 Commentators have generally reacted to these developments with 
calls for a “modernization” of the retail sales tax.10 The principal 
complaint is that the sales tax is outdated—its base is too narrow for 
a 21st century economy and should therefore be broadened to incor-
porate the consumption of services.11 Thus, for example, when a con-
sumer hires a lawyer to draft a will, the sales tax should apply to 
that purchase to the same extent that it currently applies to the sale 
of a refrigerator. Similarly, when a family hires a real estate broker 
to assist them in buying or selling a home, the state sales tax would 
presumably apply to the amount charged. After all, consumption is 
consumption. Just as there is no reason to tax red cars but not blue 
ones, there is no apparent reason for taxing goods but not services. 
Accordingly, reformers contend that all consumer purchases (with 
the exception of basic necessities of life) should be taxed and that the 
outdated distinction between goods and services in most state sales 
tax statutes should be eliminated.12 
 There is a commendable reformist instinct underlying these pro-
posals. Current calls for reforming the sales tax harken back to the 
proposals made by those who advocate a “comprehensive tax base” as 
a principal goal of federal income tax reform.13 The idea here is the 
same—all else being equal, it is generally preferable for the tax base 
to be as broad as possible. In addition to enabling lower rates, broad-
                                                                                                                    
 9. See infra Part II.D. 
 10. For example, the advocacy organization for extending the North Carolina sales 
tax to services was titled “The Commission to Modernize State Finances.” See Paul Davis, 
Professional Leery of Proposed Service Tax, THE BUSINESS JOURNAL (May 3, 2002), at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/triad/stories/2002/05/06/story2.html (last visited Mar. 30, 
2002) (on file with author); see also Ronald K. Snell, Our Outmoded Tax Systems, ARIZ. 
POL’Y CHOICES, Nov. 1997, at 36, available at http://www.asu.edu/copp/morrison/ 
tax/tax8.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2002) (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) (on file with author) 
(“Sales taxes are a good example of how states have failed to adapt their tax systems to 
changes in the economy.”). 
 11. See DANIEL MORGAN, RETAIL SALES TAX 127 (1963) (“Most advisory groups and 
most scholars who have examined the desirability of including services in the sale-tax base 
have been in favor of doing so.”); Walter Hellerstein, Extending the Sales Tax to Services: 
Notes from Florida, 34 TAX NOTES 823, 823 (1987) (“[S]ound fiscal policy . . . would in the 
eyes of most observers justify the extension of the sales tax base to many services.”); Karen 
Setze, States Should Tax Services, MTC Meeting Attendees Told, 26 ST. TAX NOTES 165, 
165 (2002) (“The states that collect sales tax should expand their bases to include taxes on 
at least some services, said a former state tax official.”); Perry D. Quick & Michael J. 
McKee, Sales Tax on Services: Revenue or Reform, 41 NAT’L TAX J. 395, 395 (1988) (“There 
is no reason why such a large and growing sector of the economy should not be taxed.”). 
 12. Presumably, most commentators would continue to allow exemptions for the basic 
necessities of life, such as food and medicine. 
 13. Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44 
(1967). But see Boris Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967). 
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ening the tax base minimizes the likelihood that close substitutes 
will be taxed differently. As a result, a broad base will generally re-
sult in fewer behavioral distortions than a narrow tax base. These 
and other arguments have led reformers to criticize the exemptions, 
exclusions and deductions that typically pervade tax statutes. The 
idea seems to be that somewhere, laying beneath real-world statutes 
with all their messiness and exceptions, there lies an “ideal” tax base 
that, with appropriate reforms, can be chiseled back into existence. 
In the case of the retail sales tax, that ideal is, of course, a tax that 
reaches all retail consumer purchases. Where the current retail sales 
tax deviates from that ideal, reform is necessary. 
 In this Article, I examine the case for extending the sales tax to 
services and conclude that, on balance, the arguments in favor of ex-
panding the base are not persuasive. Importantly, my argument is 
not an argument in favor of the status quo. Additionally, I should be 
clear up front that I am sympathetic to the general principle of 
broadening the tax base and lowering rates. Thus, I do not argue 
that sales taxes should only apply to the current narrow base 
consisting primarily of tangible goods. Rather, I argue that the ser-
vices issue is a symptom of the broader failure of the retail sales tax 
to serve effectively as a broad-based personal consumption tax. In 
large part, these failures can be traced to the design of the retail 
sales tax as a point-of-purchase transactions tax. 
 A transactions tax is appropriate when the target of the tax is the 
transfer of some specific commodity—as it is in the case of gasoline 
taxes, for example. However, where the object of the tax is to reach 
all personal consumption, collecting the levy on on a transaction-by-
transaction basis is an ineffective method of implementation. In ad-
dition to making it more difficult to tax cross-border transactions (the 
mail-order/e-commerce problem), the transactions approach is less 
susceptible to modifications designed to alter the distributional ef-
fects of the tax. It also invites policymakers to tax other transactions 
that may not represent personal consumption.14 These fundamental 
features of a transactions approach complicate the reform project and 
reduce the likelihood that a retail sales tax can ever deliver the sort 
of broad-based consumption tax that reformers envision. Rather than 
“fixing” the retail sales tax, states wanting to tax consumption 
should consider alternative taxes, such as the so-called “flat tax” or 
the cash-flow consumption tax. While not without their own difficul-
                                                                                                                    
 14. There is one sense in which a retail sales tax may be considered superior to alter-
native consumption taxes—namely, the fact that it automatically includes debt-financed 
consumption in the tax base. This is not true for the cash-flow consumption tax, which 
would require a separate accounting of the taxpayer’s borrowing transactions in order to 
function as an effective tax on consumption. For a discussion of this issue, see EDWARD J. 
MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT 132-34 (2002). 
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ties, these alternatives offer more promise in terms of fairness, effi-
ciency and administrative convenience. 
 The Article is organized as follows. Part II offers a brief synopsis 
of the history of the state and local sales tax, tracing its development 
from the early Depression years to the 21st century. Part III lays out 
the principal arguments in favor of extending the sales tax to ser-
vices. Part IV then critically examines these arguments and offers a 
detailed analysis of the arguments against the services tax. The 
principal conclusion of the Article, set forth in Part IV, is that ex-
tending the sales tax to services is likely to be an ineffective means of 
accomplishing the principal objectives of expansion advocates. 
Rather, alternative taxes on consumption are more promising candi-
dates for accomplishing these objectives. Part V then offers a brief 
overview of two major proposals for alternative consumption taxes at 
the state/local level—the “flat tax” and the cash-flow consumption 
tax. Finally, Part VI offers an overview and some summary com-
ments. 
II.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE/LOCAL SALES TAXES 
 The retail sales tax arrived relatively late on the scene of Ameri-
can public finance. Whereas income and property taxes can be traced 
to 18th and 19th century developments,15 the sales tax is primarily a 
late 20th century phenomenon.16 In this Part, I offer a brief review of 
the history of the American state and local retail sales tax and then 
discuss the emergence of the sales tax as a major state revenue 
sources in the second half of the twentieth century. Subpart A details 
the origins of the retail sales tax during the Depression years. Sub-
part B discusses the rise of the sales tax in the decades following 
World War II. Finally, Subpart C examines the continuing role of 
sales taxes as a major source of state tax revenue following the re-
peal of the deduction for sales taxes for federal income tax purposes.  
                                                                                                                    
 15. Among the major taxes used by state and local governments, the property tax has 
been around the longest. John Joseph Wallis, A History of the Property Tax in America, in 
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 123-151 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 
2001). State corporate income taxes can be traced to the late 19th century. Steven A. Bank, 
Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 167, 176-178 (2002). The personal income tax is primarily an early 20th-century phe-
nomenon. See ALZADA COMSTOCK, STATE TAXATION OF PERSONAL INCOME (1921) (discuss-
ing early history of state personal income taxes); see also RONALD JOHN HY & WILLIAM L. 
WAUGH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL TAX POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK 62 (1995). 
 16. 19th century American public finance was dominated by various tariffs and excise 
taxes. For a discussion, see Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DEN. U. L. REV. 329 
(1996) (“In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States relied on high 
tariffs and excise taxes as its principle source of revenues. This reliance was so great that 
by the 1850s, the federal tax system was dependent on import duties for 92% of its overall 
revenues.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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A.   The Depression-Era Rise of State & Local Sales Taxes 
 The first state sales tax was adopted in Mississippi in early 1932 
in response to increased revenue pressures brought about by the De-
pression.17 During the period from 1932 to 1937, a total of twenty-
three states had adopted retail sales taxes. The reasons for the surge 
in interest in the retail sales tax during the Depression years are not 
hard to see. As Pomp and Oldman note, “the sales taxes of the 1930s 
were generally considered emergency or temporary measures, which 
reflects the ambivalence with which they were adopted.”18 In other 
words, it was the fiscal crisis in which states found themselves at the 
outset of the Depression that spawned interest in the sales tax—not 
any independent desire to raise revenues through the imposition of 
taxes on consumption. This fact is important because it highlights 
the tenuous and contingent nature of our political commitment to 
taxing consumption at the state and local level. Were it not for the 
fiscal crisis of the early Depression years, it is not at all clear that 
the retail sales tax would have ever emerged as such an important 
source of revenue for state and local governments. 
 Nevertheless, the sales tax gradually became a permanent fixture 
in the fiscal structure of U.S. state and local governments. In the 
years during and following World War II, interest in the retail sales 
tax once again surged. During the period of 1942 to 1956, an addi-
tional thirteen states adopted a retail sales tax. During the 1960s, 
another twelve states joined the bandwagon and added the sales tax 
to their revenue mix. As Pomp and Oldman note, “by 1970, the sales 
tax had spread throughout the country.”19 
B.   The Base of the Modern Retail Sales Tax 
 As currently crafted, the retail sales tax extends primarily to the 
sale of tangible personal property at retail.20 This includes all the 
typical consumer products that one normally thinks of as being sub-
ject to the state retail sales tax such as household appliances, auto-
mobiles, clothing, etc. In addition, most states exempt a wide variety 
of items from the sales tax altogether.21 Among the most prominent 
                                                                                                                    
 17. For a discussion of the early history of the retail sales tax in the American states, 
see John F. Due, The Evolution of Sales Taxation, 1915-1972, in MODERN FISCAL ISSUES: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP 318-44 (Richard M. Bird & John G. Head eds., 1972). 
 18. 2 RICHARD P. PALM AND OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 6-3 (3d ed. 
1998). 
 19. Id. 
 20. For a discussion, see JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE 
TAXATION 12-61 (3d ed. 2002). 
 21. A good example of the various exemptions provided for in a state sales tax statute 
can be found in the California Revenue Code. For a thorough discussion of California’s 
sales tax and its various exemptions, see Robert H. Gleason, Comment, Reevaluating the 
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exemptions are those for food and medicine—allowance for which is 
made in order to keep the tax from reaching the basic necessities of 
life. In keeping with the theory of the tax as a tax on sales at retail, 
most states provide some sort of exemption or exclusion for items 
purchased for resale. Importantly, however, these “sale for resale” 
exemptions do not apply to a wide range of business inputs. The re-
sult is a “cascading” or “pyramiding” tax system in which sales taxes 
may be paid at several different stages of the production process. 
 In addition to tangible personal property, most states apply the 
retail sales tax to a selected number of consumer services. For exam-
ple, most states tax lodging services, utilities, and admissions to 
various amusement events.22 In the early and mid-1990s, the Federa-
tion of Tax Administrators published a series of studies showing the 
extent to which states currently tax services.23 These studies indicate 
that states generally expanded their sales tax bases to cover an in-
creased number of services during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Much of the renewed interest in taxing services may have arisen dur-
ing the 1990-91 recession, when state and local tax revenues flat-
tened because of the trough in the economy. From the mid-1990s on-
ward, however, expansion of the sales tax base to cover services has 
slowed considerably. The FTA study does not offer an explanation for 
the apparently diminished interest of states to extending the sales 
tax to cover services. One might hypothesize, however, that the lack 
of interest is due to the dramatic upswing in the economy from 1994 
onward. Now that the economy has once again slowed, and receipts 
from traditional tax sources have declined, states are once again con-
sidering alternative sources for increasing tax revenues.24 
                                                                                                                    
California Sales Tax: Exemptions, Equity, Effectiveness, and the Need for a Broader Base, 
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1681 (1996). 
 22. In addition, some states tax laundry, dry cleaning, cable TV, parking, landscap-
ing, bookkeeping, and collection services. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, 
at ch. 15. 
 23. FED’N OF TAX ADMINS., SALES TAXATION OF SERVICES: 1996 UPDATE (FTA Res. 
Rep. no. 147) (1997); FED’N OF TAX ADMINS., SALES TAXATION OF SERVICES: AN UPDATE 
(FTA Res. Rep. no. 143) (1994); FED’N OF TAX ADMINS., SALES TAXATION OF SERVICES: WHO 
TAXES WHAT? (FTA Res. Rep. no. 137) (1991); FED’N OF TAX ADMINS., SALES TAXATION OF 
SERVICES (FTA Res. Rep. no. 135) (1990). 
 24. Yet another example of this phenomenon is the recent interest in the states in tax 
amnesties. During periods of “fiscal crisis” states began looking for methods of replacing 
revenues lost in the slowed economy. The tax amnesty, whereby past tax debts can be paid 
off without penalty and sometimes without interest, offers the state an opportunity to raise 
revenue without the imposition of new taxes. Normally, states may be reluctant to engage 
in a tax amnesty program because of the deleterious incentive effects on future tax en-
forcement efforts. When facing a revenue crunch, however, states seem to be substantially 
less concerned with the long-term effects of tax amnesty programs. 
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C.   The Emergence of the Service Economy 
 At the time the sales tax was initially adopted during the early 
1930s, little attention was given to the scope of the tax base and 
whether or not it should include services. Because the U.S. economy 
was still based predominantly on the production of goods, the exclu-
sion of services from the tax base was not thought to be of much 
consequence. In fact, the importance of services as a percentage of 
total personal consumption actually declined from 1930 to 1950 (from 
41% to 33%), primarily because of manufacturing production 
undertaken in connection with World War II.25 Following the war, 
however, fundamental changes in the nature of U.S. economic 
activity began to shift production away from goods to services. The 
chart below26 illustrates the dramatic increase in services as a 







1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000




The changes illustrated in the figure above had a direct and dramatic 
effect on the retail sales tax. Federal Reserve economist Robert Tan-
nenwald has illustrated this effect by examining the long-term de-
cline in the ratio of taxable sales to gross state product.27 Whereas in 
1977 this ratio was 44.6%, by 1992 it had fallen to 38.8%.28 Thus, it 
appears that the sales tax is capturing a smaller and smaller portion 
of economic activity as the nature of the economy gradually shifts 
away from the production of tangible personal property.29 
                                                                                                                    
 25. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NATIONAL INCOME AND 
PRODUCT ACCOUNTS TABLES tbl. 1.1, at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView 
Fixed.asp?SelectedTable=3&FirstYear=1999&LastYear=2000&Freq=Qtr (last revised Jan. 
20, 2002) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (on file with author). 
 26. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, at http://www. 
bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableViewFixed.asp#Mid (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
 27. Robert Tannenwald, Are State and Local Revenue Systems Becoming Obsolete?, 
NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Issue No. 4, 2001, at 27, 32, available at http://www.bos.frb.org/ 
economic/neer/neer2001/neer401b.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Tannenwald notes that the ratio actually rose slightly during the period from 1992 
to 1997. However, he attributes this rise to the cyclical influence of strength in the U.S. 
economy during these years. “This cyclical surge,” he explains, “more than offset the nega-
tive impact of the secular shift in consumption toward services.” Id. at 32. 
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D.   The Effect of Nondeductibility and the Rise of E-Commerce 
 Interestingly, just as the new “service economy” began to shift into 
high gear in the mid-eighties and early-nineties, two new develop-
ments added to the increasing pressure on the retail sales tax. 
 The first was the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.30 Nearly 
two decades later, it is easy to lose sight of the significance of the 
1986 legislation, especially for state and local governments. By the 
mid-1980s, it appeared that Congress was set to enact dramatic 
changes with respect to the issue of “fiscal federalism.” To the aston-
ishment of many governors, mayors, and state legislators, in May 
1985 the Reagan Administration’s Treasury Department recom-
mended repealing the deduction for all state and local taxes.31 The 
proposed change was part of an overall proposal to broaden the tax 
base and lower rates.32 In making the case for repeal, the Admini-
stration contended that the deduction was unfair because it “dispro-
portionately benefits high-income taxpayers residing in high-tax 
States.”33 Moreover, in keeping with the Treasury’s general push to 
broaden the federal income tax base, the Treasury Department ar-
gued that the deduction for state and local taxes eroded the tax base 
and represented an inefficient method of subsidizing state and local 
governments.34 
 Congressional reaction to these proposals was mixed. While Con-
gress shared the instinct to broaden the tax base, legislators faced 
substantial pressure from state and local elected officials to limit the 
effects of tax reform on state and local budgets.35 The political com-
promise reached was that the deduction for state and local income 
and property taxes would be retained, but the deduction for state and 
local sales taxes would be repealed.36 
 The rationale for repealing the deduction for sales taxes but not 
for income or property taxes is not entirely clear. As Michael Graetz 
has noted, Treasury officials may have believed that “income taxes 
‘reduce the resources available to the payor for consumption or ac-
cumulation,’ but that general sales taxes do not reduce income re-
                                                                                                                    
 30. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
 31. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS 
FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 62-69 (May 1985) [hereinafter, REAGAN’S PRO-
POSALS]. 
 32. For a fascinating discussion of the legislative history of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 
see JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH (1987). 
 33. REAGAN’S PROPOSALS, supra note 31, at 62. 
 34. Id. at 63-64. 
 35. One New Jersey mayor termed the proposal “an absolute disaster.” New York 
Governor Mario Cuomo declared the elimination of the deduction to be “a regional death 
sentence.” Michael I. Luger, Federal Tax Reform and the Interjurisdictional Mobility Im-
pulse, 23 J. URB. ECON. 235, 235 (1988). 
 36. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 § 134(a)(1) (1986). 
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ported by households and individuals and have ‘already been de-
ducted from income sources,’ except to the extent that sales tax rates 
vary among states and localities.”37 Alternatively, one might argue 
that sales tax should not be deductible because of the impracticabil-
ity of substantiating a sales tax deduction. Whereas the amount of 
income and property taxes paid to state and local governments is 
relatively easy to track, sales taxes are collected in dribs and drabs, 
making substantiation of one’s aggregate sales tax expenses for the 
year substantially more difficult.38 
 In any event, the effect of the repeal of the deduction for sales 
taxes was to increase the tax price of public goods financed with sales 
taxes. Whereas prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 the tax cost of $1 
worth of public goods financed with sales taxes was reduced by the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, after the Act that tax cost rose to re-
flect the absence of a federal income tax deduction for the amounts. 
Consequently, commentators writing at the time expected state and 
local budgets to shift away from sales tax to a heavier reliance on in-
come and property taxes.39 This prediction seems reasonable—after 
all, the choice of tax instruments post-1986 was between those taxes 
where the federal government would pay a portion of the actual cost 
and those where the burden fell entirely on state and local residents. 
 Interestingly, however, the repeal of the deduction for sales taxes 
appears to have had little effect on the extent to which state and lo-
cal governments rely on them to fund public services. In part this 
may be due to historical happenstance. During the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, unrelated developments limited the extent to which 
state and local governments could turn to property and income taxes 
to replace sales taxes. First, popular initiatives in several states lim-
ited the property tax.40 In California, for example, the famous How-
ard Jarvis initiative, Proposition 13, pushed property tax assess-
ments back to 1975-76 levels and capped the property tax rate at one 
                                                                                                                    
 37. Michael Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
1575, 1593 n.59 (1979). 
 38. The solution to this problem, prior to 1986, was to permit taxpayers to claim a de-
duction for a specified amount based upon their adjusted gross income and the state in 
which they lived. Taxpayers could always show that they were entitled to a higher deduc-
tion by substantiating the amount with actual receipts showing sales taxes paid. The ap-
proach was admittedly imperfect, but at least workable. 
 39. See David E. Wildasin, The (Apparent) Demise of Sales Tax Deductibility: Issues 
for Analysis and Policy, 41 NAT’L TAX J. 381, 384 (1988) (“[O]ne would expect to see the ju-
risdiction in question substitute other revenue sources for the sales tax because the mar-
ginal cost of raising funds from this source will have increased as a result of the elimina-
tion of deductibility.”). 
 40. For a discussion, see ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX 
REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 (1995). 
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percent.41 Second, several states followed the federal government’s 
lead in the early 1980s of indexing income tax rates for inflation.42 
This change had the effect of eliminating the automatic revenue in-
creases that resulted from inflation prior to the adoption of indexed 
tax rates. To shift from sales to income taxes, therefore, would have 
required explicit increases in tax rates, which is always a politically 
difficult proposition. 
 An alternative explanation for why state and local governments 
have continued to rely on the retail sales tax despite its nondeducti-
bility is grounded in cognitive theory.43 Recent research has demon-
strated that individuals often exhibit a cognitive bias that leads them 
to underestimate aggregate cost when it is presented in the form of 
several smaller costs.44 For example, as Slemrod and Krishna ex-
plain, it is a common marketing gimmick to express the cost for some 
item in terms of “cost per day” or some other such unit. Thus, an item 
or service that costs $300 per year may be advertised as “pennies per 
day!”45 Presenting the cost this way leaves the consumer with the 
impression that the item is cheaper than it actually is. In the same 
way, it is often difficult for taxpayers to recognize how much they ac-
tually pay in retail sales taxes because the tax is collected in small 
amounts over the course of several months in hundreds of separate 
purchases. While the total tax imposed may be the same, the per-
ceived tax is substantially less. 
 The second major development of the 1990s that began to eclipse 
the retail sales tax is the rise of electronic commerce. As noted at the 
outset of this Article, e-commerce is in some sense really nothing but 
old wine in new bottles. For decades states have struggled with the 
issue of how to tax mail-order sales where the retailer has little or no 
connection to the taxing state.46 The problem is partly a legal one. In 
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, the U.S. Su-
preme Court determined that any effort by states to impose a use-tax 
                                                                                                                    
 41. For a general overview of Proposition 13, see Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on 
Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 197-201 (2001). 
 42. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & T. CODE § 17041(h). 
 43. For an overview of these issues, see Edward J. McCaffrey, Cognitive Theory and 
Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861 (1994). 
 44. Slemrod and Krishna describe recent research as showing that “people are much 
more willing to donate to charities when the outlay is presented in ‘pennies-a-day’ terms 
versus when the same outlay is presented as an aggregate payment.” See Joel Slemrod & 
Aradhna Krishna, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design As Price Presentation (May 16, 
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
 45. Id. 
 46. There is an additional, related issue concerning internet transactions that is 
uniquely attributable to recent technological developments—i.e., the increasing ease with 
which certain products that were traditionally packaged as tangible personal property 
(e.g., music and videos) can now be transmitted in a digitized format. This raises an issue 
concerning whether the products may be taxed as tangible personal property, which is 
what most state sales tax statutes are designed to reach. 
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collection obligation on out-of-state mail-order vendors would be con-
trary to both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution.47 A quarter century later, in its Quill decision, the 
Court backed off of its Due Process holding, but still prevented states 
from requiring out-of-state vendors with no physical presence in the 
taxing state from collecting sales/use taxes for that state.48 The pre-
cise issue in Quill was whether the Commerce Clause prevents states 
from imposing a use tax collection obligation on out-of-state vendors 
where the vendor has no physical “nexus” to the taxing state. States 
may still collect “use taxes” directly from consumers, but as a practi-
cal (and political) matter, it is all but impossible for states to enforce 
their use tax statutes in this manner.49  
 In combination, these two developments—the repeal of the federal 
deduction and the rise of e-commerce—have substantially diminished 
the attractiveness of the retail sales tax as a stable and dynamic 
source of state revenue. By the end of the 20th century, the retail 
sales tax, which originated during the Depression in response to the 
weaknesses of other tax bases, had begun to suffer its own weak-
nesses. It was only natural, therefore, for states to begin to consider 
how to bolster the stability of the retail sales tax by reforming and 
broadening its base. 
III.   ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING                                                   
THE SALES TAX TO SERVICES 
 There is a strong tradition in U.S. tax policy circles of emphasiz-
ing the importance of a “comprehensive tax base” (CTB) as a goal of 
tax reform. CTB advocates highlight the costs associated with a nar-
row tax base.50 Where the tax base is too narrow, there is a greater 
likelihood that close substitutes will be taxed differently, which in-
creases the chances of economic distortion. In addition, where some 
                                                                                                                    
 47. 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional Illinois’ tax on mail-order busi-
ness, National Bellas Hess, because of the taxpayer’s lack of physical nexus to the state). 
 48. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 49. Noncompliance with use tax obligations is nearly universal—in fact, most con-
sumers are not even aware of the requirement to pay state use taxes for items purchased 
tax-free from out-of-state vendors. Use taxes collected from consumers tend only to be ef-
fective where there is some sort of information-reporting obligation associated with the 
out-of-state purchase, as in the case of automobiles purchased out-of-state for use in the 
taxing state. There is little hope for more effective use tax compliance. As Michael Mazerov 
notes, “most experts agree that it would be unrealistic to expect more than a small fraction 
of use taxes to be self-remitted by individual consumers unless purchasers were subject to 
use tax audits or other enforcement actions that would raise significant privacy concerns.” 
Michael Mazerov, A Five-Year Extension of the Internet Tax Moratorium Would Further 
Erode the Tax Base of State and Localities, 21 ST. TAX NOTES 957, 957 n.1 (2001).  
 50. See, e.g., David Brunori, Sorry, But We’re Broke—The Politics of State Taxation, 
23 ST. TAX NOTES 201, 202 (2002) (describing Florida Senate President John McKay’s pro-
posal to extend the state’s sales tax to services as evidencing “a basic tenet of sound tax 
policy—low rates and broad base”). 
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persons or transactions are taxed while others are not, there is an is-
sue of horizontal equity—the less comprehensive the tax base, the 
more likely it is that similarly situated individuals are being taxed 
differently. Finally, a narrow tax base necessarily requires higher tax 
rates to generate a given level of revenue than would be necessary 
with a broader tax base. As a general matter, therefore, a broader, 
more comprehensive tax base is thought to serve important goals of 
fairness and economic efficiency. In the context of sales tax reform, 
this base broadening instinct has led reformers to advocate extending 
the sales tax base beyond the traditional focus on tangible personal 
property to encompass services. Extending the sales tax base to ser-
vices is thought to serve several policy objectives. 
A.   Taxing Services Raises and Stabilizes Revenue 
 The first and perhaps most obvious attraction of extending the 
sale tax to services is the revenue potential inherent in such a 
change. Estimates vary, but one former state revenue official re-
cently noted that merely adding “some” services to the tax base 
“could mean additional revenue of between twenty percent and thirty 
percent.”51 The same official indicated that with the inclusion of ser-
vices consumed by businesses, states could see revenue increases of 
up to seventy percent.52 These are hardly numbers to be scoffed at. 
Recent news reports suggest that states may be facing their worst 
fiscal crisis since World War II.53 For example, California’s Legisla-
tive Analyst recently estimated that California faces a budget deficit 
of $34.6 billion for the year 2003-2004.54 In this era of declining tax 
receipts and budget shortfalls, the untapped revenue potential of tax-
ing services can be especially attractive. 
 Perhaps more significantly, including services in the sales tax 
base could have the effect of enhancing the overall stability of the 
tax. All else being equal, it is generally preferable for governments to 
use taxes that can be relied upon to provide a steady stream of reve-
nue as compared to those that fluctuate wildly with changing eco-
nomic circumstances. Many government activities involve a commit-
ment of funds over several years, even decades.55 Taxes that generate 
                                                                                                                    
 51. Setze, supra note 11, at 165. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Robert Pear, States Are Facing Big Fiscal Crises, Governors Report, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at A1 (“Plunging tax collections and soaring medical costs have cre-
ated the worst fiscal problems for states since World War II, the National Governors Asso-
ciation said today.”). 
 54. LEGIS. ANALYSTS OFF., ST. OF CAL., 2003-04: OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNOR’S 
BUDGET 4, 6 (2003), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2003/budget_overview/03-
04_budget_overview.pdf) (last visited Jan. 15, 2003) (on file with author). 
 55. The foremost example, of course, is public education. 
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highly variable revenue streams make long-term planning for these 
undertakings difficult, if not impossible. 
 Whether or not taxing services would stabilize revenues depends 
in large part on which services are taxed and which are not. In their 
study of sales tax stability in thirteen states, economists Eleanor 
Craig and Robert Bohm found that manufactured housing and repair 
services were generally procyclical and thus unlikely to stabilize 
sales tax revenues. By contrast, rental services and professional ser-
vices (other than medical and legal services) would add stability to 
the sales tax because revenues would typically not decline during 
economic downturns.56 Thus, the role of a services tax in enhancing 
overall revenue stability seems somewhat mixed. Perhaps because of 
these uncertainties, advocates of extending the sales tax to services 
have tended to focus their arguments on the issues of fairness and ef-
ficiency. It is to those arguments that I now turn. 
B.   Taxing Services Increases the Efficiency of the Sales Tax 
 The principal economic argument in favor of taxing services is 
that doing so would minimize the potential distortion of the sales tax 
at the point of sale when the consumer is deciding between goods and 
services. Where tax-free services can be purchased as a substitute (or 
near substitute) for taxable goods, consumers will avoid the tax by 
opting for the service. More broadly, wherever tax rates vary sub-
stantially between close substitutes, consumers can be expected to 
choose the option with the lower rate. This type of argument surfaces 
frequently in tax policy discussions and is often offered in support of 
base-broadening reforms.57 In the context of sales tax reform, com-
mentators typically posit a choice between purchasing a new item 
(e.g., a car) or having the old one repaired. To the extent that repair 
services are not taxed, then at the margin one would expect consum-
ers who might otherwise prefer to buy a new car to have the old car 
repaired instead. Clearly this is a suboptimal outcome in terms of the 
individual’s resource allocation. Because of the differential tax treat-
ment of goods and services, the consumer ends up choosing an option 
he would not have otherwise chosen. 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Robert Bohm et al., States Sales Tax Revenue Response to Base Modification, 5 ST. 
TAX NOTES 797 (1993). See also Carol Douglas, State Revenue Forecasting Becoming More 
Sophisticated, 33 TAX NOTES 624 (1996) (describing preliminary results of Craig/Bohm 
study). 
 57. For a discussion, see Tatsuo Hatta & John Hhaltiwanger, Tax Reform and Strong 
Substitutes, 27 INT’L ECON. REV. 303 (1986). 
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C.   Taxing Services Would Make the Sales Tax Less Regressive 
 A third argument typically offered in favor of extending the sales 
tax to services concerns the effect that the change would have on the 
overall distribution of the sales tax burden. To understand this ar-
gument, it is necessary to say a few words about the distributional 
impact of sales taxes more generally. One of the most common objec-
tions to sales taxes is that they tend to be regressive in relation to 
taxpayers’ income.58 That is, because low-income taxpayers tend to 
consume a greater percentage of their income than do high-income 
taxpayers, a flat rate sales tax applied to all forms of consumption 
will necessarily take more (in percentage terms) from a low-income 
household’s income than from a high-income household’s income.59 
 This is, of course, a very familiar point, but one that nonetheless 
merits illustration. For example, consider two families, one that 
earns $100,000 in wages, spending $70,000 and saving $30,000, and 
another that earns $50,000 in wages, spending $45,000 and saving 
$5,000. A flat-rate consumption tax of 10% on these two households 
has the identical distributive effect as a regressive wage tax, with an 
effective rate of 9% on the low-income household and 7% on the high-
wage household.60 In fact, the regressive effects of sales taxes may be 
exacerbated by the fact that many low-income households actually 
“dissave”—that is, their annual expenditures exceed their annual in-
come. For example, consider a third family that earns $20,000 in 
wages, but spends $30,000.61 Such a family would pay $3,000 in sales 
taxes, representing 15% of their total wages. To summarize:  
                                                                                                                    
 58. See William F. Fox & Matthew Murray, Economic Aspects of Taxing Services, 41 
NAT’L TAX J. 19, 29 (1988) (“Conventional wisdom on the burden of the current sales tax 
structure suggests that it is mildly regressive.”); see also James A. Fellows, Consumption 
Taxes: A View of Future Tax Reform in America, CPA J. ONLINE (April 1, 1994), at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/15410229.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (on file 
with author) (“Those who criticize consumption-based taxation usually do so on the theory 
these taxes are regressive in nature, i.e., consumption-based taxes are felt to be more bur-
densome on the poor than on any other economic group. The reasoning is the poor spend 
most all of their income.”). 
 59. Whether or not this is objectionable depends in part on one’s view regarding what 
constitutes an appropriate measure of an individual’s well-being. The examples in the text 
assume that “income” is the proper measure. Thus, how much a tax burden varies accord-
ing to an individual’s income is thought to be a relevant measure of the tax’s fairness. It is 
not obvious, however, that income is the best measure of well-being. For a fuller discussion 
of these issues, see Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE: THE 
ONGOING DEBATE (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002). 
 60. This analysis assumes away any differential economic effects of a consumption tax 
and a wage tax. 
 61. Dissaving is a pervasive phenomenon in low-income households. According to the 
most recent Consumer Expenditure Survey, the average income of the lowest twenty per-
cent of households (ranked by income) was $7,683, while the average annual expenditure 
of the same group was $17,940. By contrast, households in the highest twenty percent had 
an average annual income of $110,118 and average annual expenditures of $75,102. 
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 The distributional effects of existing retail sales taxes are, of 
course, substantially more complicated than the illustrations above 
suggest because most states tax only a fraction of a household’s total 
consumption. Most significantly, most states exempt from the sales 
tax base various basic necessities of life, such as food and medicine. 
These exemptions tend to make the sales tax less regressive than the 
illustration above would suggest. Another important category of tax-
exempt consumption is housing services.63 At least one study has 
suggested that including housing in the sales tax base would make 
the tax even more regressive. On the other hand, the exclusion of 
other types of consumption, such as higher education and foreign 
travel, almost certainly contributes to the regressive nature of sales 
taxes because such items are consumed primarily by high-income 
households. If this is in fact the case, then extending the sales tax to 
services would make the tax less regressive with regard to income.  
For example, assume for the moment that the only reform under con-
sideration is whether to extend the sales tax to some type of luxury 
consumption—say, cross-Atlantic flights on the Concorde. If only in-
dividuals with incomes in excess of $1 million fly on the Concorde, 
then such a reform would enhance the progressivity of sales taxes. 
By contrast, if the sales tax were extended only to public transporta-
tion services, which tend to be consumed disproportionately by low-
                                                                                                                    
(2002), available at http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxann00.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (on file 
with author). 
 62. John J. Siegfried & Paul A. Smith, The Distributional Effects of a Sales Tax on 
Services, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 41, 47 tbl.2 (1991). 
 63. D.G. Davies & D.E. Black, Equity Effects of Including Housing Services in a Sales 
Tax Base, 28 NAT’L TAX J. 135 (1975). 
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income households, then the tax would become more regressive. In 
short, the precise distributional effects of extending the sales tax to 
services depends critically on which types of services will be taxed. 
IV.   THE UNEASY CASE FOR EXTENDING THE SALES TAX TO SERVICES 
 As noted above, there are several strong arguments in favor of ex-
tending the sales tax to services. First, it seems clear that including 
services in the sales tax base could substantially increase state and 
local revenues. At a time of increased budget pressures, this is not an 
insignificant factor. Perhaps more significantly, taxing services 
would enhance the revenue stability of the sales tax, making it less 
susceptible to the cyclical movement of the economy. 
 Second, there is reason to believe that the present differential 
sales tax treatment of goods and services distorts economic behavior. 
Where consumers can replicate the consumption value of a taxable 
good with a non-taxable service, as seems likely in the case of repairs 
for example, then the failure to tax services (or, equivalently, the 
failure to exempt goods) will lead some consumers to choose to con-
sume services even though they would have preferred goods. To the 
extent that we are concerned with the efficiency costs of the tax sys-
tem, therefore, we should reform the sales tax so as to avoid these 
distortions. 
 Finally, commentators have argued that taxing services would 
make the sales tax less regressive. As explained above, this argu-
ment is grounded in the empirical assumption that high-income 
households will devote a greater percentage of their income to tax-
able services than will low-income households. Thus, assuming a flat-
rate sales tax, including services in the tax base should enhance the 
progressivity of the tax base. 
 Each of these arguments has some appeal and the instinct to re-
form the sales tax to make it more stable, more economically effi-
cient, and more progressive is understandable. Nevertheless, there 
are reasons to be skeptical of proposals to extend the sales tax to ser-
vices.  In the sections below, I examine three of the main arguments 
against taxing services. 
A.   The Nondeductibility of the Sales Tax 
 The first and perhaps most obvious reason not to extend the sales 
tax to services is that sales taxes are no longer deductible for pur-
poses of the federal income tax. As noted above, in 1986 Congress re-
pealed the deduction for retail sales taxes as part of the historic Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.64 Consequently, only income and property taxes 
                                                                                                                    
 64. See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text. 
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are deductible under current law.65 The principal effect of this change 
in the law was to raise the effective “tax price” of state/local public 
goods financed with retail sales taxes.66 Whereas prior to the 1986 
legislation $1 worth of public goods or services would cost the indi-
vidual taxpayer only $1 multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal fed-
eral income tax rate, after 1986 the taxpayer bears the full cost of the 
tax increase.67 Given this tax price differential, a self-interested legis-
lature should opt for income or property taxes over sales taxes. 
 Of course, this argument applies to any increase in the sales tax—
not just the extension of the sales tax to services.68 Thus, if the alter-
native to extending the sales tax to services is to raise current sales 
tax rates without expanding the base of the tax, this argument would 
apply equally forcefully there as well. Still, federal income tax de-
ductibility is a central consideration where a state has chosen to un-
dertake a fundamental restructuring of one of its principal revenue 
sources. It would seem that these choices should be guided by the ef-
fective after-tax cost of the change. 
 In addition, one of the arguments advanced in favor of extending 
the sales tax to services is that the tax would fall predominantly on 
higher income earners, as compared to the existing retail sales tax, 
which is thought to be regressive.69 I will discuss the point further be-
                                                                                                                    
 65. 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2000). 
 66. For useful discussions of the concept of “tax price,” see RONALD C. FISHER, STATE 
AND LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE 371 (1996) and JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 133, 152 (2d ed. 1988). See also Walter Hettich, Tax Price, in THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 391-92 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999) 
(describing tax price as “[a] concept developed in analogy to price as observed in private 
markets”); Stark, supra note 41, at 217-19. 
 67. This analysis abstracts from questions of “tax incidence”—i.e., the question of who 
ultimately bears the economic burden of a tax. That analysis is not relevant to the question 
discussed here, which is the effect on the tax price of the elimination of the deductibility of 
the sales tax. In other words, whoever bears the economic burden of the tax, that burden is 
increased as a result of the repeal of the deductibility of the sales tax. 
 68. Note that the distinction between sales and nonsales taxes under section 164 has 
created some unusual situations at the state/local level. For example, when crafting “re-
funds” of taxes during the boom years of the late 1990s, states were very careful to refund 
sales taxes and not deductible income or property taxes. The reason, of course, is that any 
refund of income or sales tax would constitute taxable income for the recipients as those 
amounts were deductible in earlier years. This so-called “tax benefit rule” (i.e., that one 
must include in income any recovery of an item deducted in a previous year) is one of the 
fundamental principles of tax accounting. I.R.C. § 111 (2000). At the extreme, one could 
imagine states imposing new, deductible taxes for the sole purpose of providing a pool of 
money that would be used for refunding non-deductible taxes, thereby converting these 
non-deductible taxes into deductible taxes. Such a scheme is currently under consideration 
in Texas, which of course is constitutionally forbidden from imposing income taxes. The 
Texas plan would provide for a so-called “voluntary” income tax and taxpayers who choose 
to pay the new income tax would be refunded their sales taxes. 
 69. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 11, at 127 (observing that “[m]ost advisory groups 
and most scholars who have examined the desirability of including services in the sales-tax 
base have been in favor of doing so [because, among other things,] . . . service inclusion al-
leviates regressivity”). 
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low and question whether this is in fact true. For now, however, it is 
worth noting that the supposed distributional effect of extending the 
sales tax to services serves as a counterargument to the point made 
above regarding the non-deductibility of all sales taxes. In the case of 
increasing sales tax rates, nondeductibility arises from the fact that 
many of those who pay the tax do not itemize their deductions for 
federal income tax purposes.70 Yet if proponents of extending the 
sales tax to services are right about the distributional effects of such 
a change—i.e., that it will fall predominantly on high-income earn-
ers—then we are targeting a group of taxpayers who actually could 
deduct those taxes, if only we would use a tax instrument that is not 
disfavored under the federal tax laws. Thus, the deductibility issue is 
even more relevant in the context of extending the sales tax to ser-
vices than in the case of simply raising rates. 
B.   The Uncertain Distributional Effects of Taxing Services 
 A second argument commonly offered in support of extending the 
sales tax to services is that doing so would help to mitigate the re-
gressive effects of the sales tax.71 Despite the frequency with which 
this observation is made, it is not clear why we should care about the 
distributional effects of the sales tax in isolation.72 There is nothing 
inherently objectionable about the way a single tax, viewed in isola-
tion, burdens different income classes. Rather, distributional argu-
ments implicate the tax-and-transfer system as a whole.73 Unless the 
concern is merely an aesthetic one—i.e., that we are somehow of-
fended at the very existence of a regressive tax—then the argument 
seems misplaced. 
 The more appropriate inquiry, it seems, is to focus on the distribu-
tional impact of taxing services, as compared to alternative methods 
of raising revenue. In other words, given that $X amount of revenue 
                                                                                                                    
 70. For the tax year 2000, the most recent year for which data are available, 32.9% of 
taxpayers itemized their deductions. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, TAX STATS AT A GLANCE, at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/taxstats/arti-
cle/0,,id=102886,00.html (last revised July 22, 2002) (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (on file 
with author). By contrast, 66.2% of individual filers claimed the standard deduction. Id. 
 71. For example, Due and Friedlaender assert that the sales tax would be less regres-
sive if all services were included in the sales tax base. See JOHN F. DUE & ANN F. FRIED-
LAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 425 (7th ed. 1981).  
 72. I am grateful to my friend Adam Wergeles for bringing this point to my attention. 
 73. For example, those who prefer more redistributive government policies presuma-
bly would not favor an increase in the progressivity in the sales tax if it were going to be 
exactly offset by increases in the regressivity of some other tax or by changing public 
spending to favor high-income families. Thus, the appropriate target of analysis is how the 
system as a whole affects different income classes. Of course, one could take this argument 
even one step further, noting that the real inquiry should be, “What is a just distribution of 
societal resources?” For a discussion of this very point, see LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NA-
GEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002).  
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must be raised, policymakers may wish to know how the distribu-
tional consequences of Policy A compare to the those of Policy B. This 
approach takes as an implicit baseline the present distribution of so-
cietal resources and simply asks how alternative tax policies would 
alter that distribution. With regard to this specific inquiry, the evi-
dence on extending the sales tax to services, it turns out, is quite 
mixed. 
 The most prominent study of the distributional effects of extend-
ing the sales tax to services was undertaken by economists John 
Siegfried and Paul Smith.74 Siegfried and Smith used data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) and the Input-Output Structure 
of the U.S. Economy to assess the effect on different income classes of 
Florida’s aborted sales tax on services in 1987. According to their es-
timates, “the Florida sales tax on services was generally regressive, 
but not much so beyond the twentieth percentile of the income distri-
bution, and it was even progressive between the sixtieth and eighti-
eth percentiles.”75 In other words, assuming one accepts the Sieg-
fried-Smith methodology, it does not appear that the aborted Florida 
services tax would have contributed significantly to the overall pro-
gressivity of the state’s tax structure. Table 2 below shows the Sieg-
fried-Smith results:  
 
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF FLORIDA’S 5% SALES TAX ON SERVICES 
PERCENTAGE OF INCOME PAID AS TAX FOR CONSUMER UNITS AT STATED PERCENTILE 
OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION76 
 
Top 5 Services 20th          
percentile 
40th        
percentile 
60th        
percentile 
80th           
percentile 
Residential Repair 0.1727 0.1521 0.1508 0.1979 
Misc.                     
Business Services 
0.0750 0.0708 0.0722 0.0691 
Advertising 0.0645 0.0612 0.0568 0.0540 
Non-Residential 
Repair 
0.0543 0.0481 0.0436 0.0412 
Professional          
Services 
0.0341 0.0312 0.0294 0.0286 
                                                                                                                    
 74. Siegfried & Smith, supra note 62. 
 75. Id. at 49. 
 76. Id. at 50 tbl.3. 
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Total Effect* 0.4979 0.4547 0.4408 0.4772 
*The “Total Effect” represents the aggregate of all taxed services, not just the 
five shown here. 
 
 As these data suggest, the precise distributional effect of taxing 
services depends critically on which services are included in the tax 
base and which are not. Thus, for example, while a sales tax on ad-
vertising or nonresidential repair services is consistently income-
regressive in the Siegfried-Smith results, the distributional effect of 
taxing residential repairs and business services appears to be more 
complicated. Indeed, the category “Residential Repair”—by far the 
most significant portion of the increased tax burden, accounting for 
roughly one-third of the increased burden at each income percen-
tile—has a U-shaped distributional pattern. That is, the incremental 
burden of extending the sales tax to residential repair services (as a 
percentage of income) declines from the twentieth to fortieth percen-
tiles, holds steady from the fortieth to sixtieth percentile, but then 
rises again from the sixtieth to the eightieth percentile. 
 While not immune from criticism, these findings highlight the 
weak empirical foundation for the claim that taxing services would 
necessarily prove to be a progressivity-enhancing (or regressivity-
reducing) change in the law. While including certain services in the 
tax base may make the overall burden less regressive, the inclusion 
of other services consumed primarily by low- to middle-income 
households is likely to have the opposite distributional effect. More-
over, the picture is further complicated by the fact that consumer re-
sponsiveness to tax-induced price increases (i.e., the “price elasticity 
of demand”) is likely to be different at different income levels.  If 
price sensitivity does vary by income, it becomes even harder to pre-
dict the distributional effects of extending the sales tax to services. In 
short, without a precise understanding of which services would be in-
cluded in the tax base, how consumption of those services is distrib-
uted across different income levels, and how the price elasticity of 
demand for these services varies according to income level, it is sim-
ply impossible to know exactly how a change in the scope of the sales 
tax base would affect the overall distribution of the sales tax burden. 
 These difficulties in gauging the distributional effects of a change 
in the sales tax base relate largely to the design of the retail sales tax 
as a point-of-purchase transactions tax. One problem with a transac-
tions tax is that the state has no information about the taxpayer at 
the moment the tax is collected—that is, at the point of purchase. 
Unless it were possible to vary sales tax rates by requiring consum-
ers to make retail transactions with some sort of ID card that in-
cluded electronic information regarding income levels (a policy that, 
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presumably, few would endorse), the only way to adjust the distribu-
tional effects of a transaction-based tax is through manipulations of 
the sales tax base. Unfortunately, manipulating the tax base is a 
highly inefficient and imprecise means of introducing more progres-
sivity. 
C.   The Pyramiding Effects of Taxing Business Inputs 
 Finally, one of the most significant issues relating to the extension 
of the sales tax to services concerns the taxation of so-called business 
inputs. As numerous commentators have observed, the underlying 
philosophy of the retail sales tax is to impose a uniform tax on all re-
tail consumption.77 In furtherance of this general policy, most states 
with a retail sales tax either define “retail sale” to exclude sales for 
resale or provide a general “sale for resale” exemption from the tax.78 
Thus, a retailer that purchases stereo equipment from a manufac-
turer to sell to customers in the ordinary course of his business is 
typically exempt from the sales tax.79 Instead, the stereo equipment 
will be subject to the sales tax when it is sold to the ultimate con-
sumer.80 The effect of the sale for resale exemption is the same as the 
allowance of a credit for taxes paid within the credit-invoice method 
value-added tax system—i.e., it ensures that the tax paid at an ear-
lier stage of production is not itself included in the sales tax base. 
 One of the principal criticisms of the retail sales tax as it is actu-
ally deployed in the American states is the failure of states to allow a 
comprehensive “sale for resale” exemption. Despite the supposed 
“philosophy” of the tax as a tax on household consumption, most 
states in fact impose sales taxes on a wide variety of business inputs. 
In fact, one study found that as much as sixty-five percent of one 
state’s sales tax burden consists of taxes paid by businesses on their 
intermediate purchases.81 The effects of this flaw in the design of the 
sales tax are not merely theoretical. The inclusion of business inputs 
in the sales tax base creates a “cascading” or “pyramiding” of the tax 
burden, with the result that household sales tax burdens will vary 
                                                                                                                    
 77. See, e.g., Brunori, supra note 50, at 202 (“As leading sales tax scholars continue to 
remind us, taxing business inputs is not very good tax policy. Taxation of business inputs 
obscures the tax and often leads to increased, albeit hidden, burdens on the consumer.”). 
 78. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 14-5 to 14-82. 
 79. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6007 (West 2002) (defining “retail sale” as a 
“sale for any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business in the form of tan-
gible personal property”). 
 80. Similarly, a manufacturer that purchases widgets that will be included as a com-
ponent of the widgometers that it manufactures will typically not be required to pay a 
sales tax on its purchase of those widgets. Instead, the widgometers (including that portion 
attributable to the widget component) will be taxed when they are ultimately sold to a con-
sumer at retail. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 14-23 to 14-36. 
 81. Raymond J. Ring, Jr., The Proportion of Consumers’ and Producers’ Goods in the 
General Sales Tax, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 167 (1989).  
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depending upon how many stages of production their particular con-
sumption bundle went through. This effect can be illustrated with a 
simple example. 
 Consider a company that purchases a widget for $100 that will be 
used as a component of a widgometer that the company plans to sell 
to customers. If the $100 widget purchase is taxed at a sales tax rate 
of, say, 10%, the company will owe a $10 tax on the initial purchase. 
In other words, the total cost of the widget is $110 to the company. 
When the company then sells that widget to a consumer as part of 
the widgometer, it will include in the price for the widgometer the 
$110 cost of purchasing the widget. Consequently, at this second re-
tail stage the retail sales tax attributable to the cost of the widget 
will be $11. Thus, even though the widget was sold at retail only 
once, a tax of $21 will apply—for an effective tax rate of 21%, more 
than twice the statutory rate of 10%. 
 There is nothing inherently wrong with double taxation.82 Tax sys-
tems “double tax” things all the time. For example, suppose a worker 
decides to invest some of his wages in a interest-bearing bond. First 
the worker is taxed on the wages as he earns them.83 Then he is 
taxed again on interest paid on the bonds.84 It is even possible that 
he will be taxed yet again when he transfers the bond to his children 
by gift or bequest.85 But there is something very peculiar about the 
layers of taxation created by a sales tax that taxes business inputs.  
Assuming that these burdens are ultimately borne by consumers, a 
household whose consumption bundle contains a disproportionate 
share of multistage products will thus bear a heavier burden than a 
household whose products are produced entirely within a single, 
vertically-integrated business. It is hard to think of a reason why tax 
burdens should vary on this basis. Generally speaking, a good tax 
system will not impose randomly-differential tax burdens. 
 Unfortunately, the potential for taxing business inputs is espe-
cially high when it comes to the question of taxing services. As Sieg-
fried and Smith note, “[s]ome of the service industries that have the 
greatest revenue potential (e.g., railroad and motor freight, utilities, 
communication, banking, insurance, real estate, advertising, busi-
ness services, and professional services) produce most of the output 
                                                                                                                    
 82. Consider, for example, what the substantive difference would be between a single 
flat-tax on wages of 20% and two separate flat-rate wage taxes of 10%. The worker who 
earns, say, $40,000 pays a tax of $8,000 under both systems. Is the second system some-
how more objectionable than the first simply because it imposes two taxes? If so, it is hard 
to see the rationale for the distinction. In the end, the argument against “double taxation” 
may simply be an argument against “excessive” taxation and the size of government. 
 83. I.R.C. § 1 (2000) (individual income tax); id. § 61(a)(1) (including in income 
“compensation for services”). 
 84. Id. § 1 (individual income tax); id. § 61(a)(4) (including interest in income). 
 85. Id. § 2001(a) (estate tax); id. § 2501(a) (gift tax). 
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for intermediate use.”86 Accordingly, there is extraordinary pressure 
on legislators when extending the sales tax to cover services to in-
clude in taxable services those that represent intermediate purchases 
for business use. 
 Consider the case of legal services. While many types of legal ser-
vices would seem to be appropriate candidates for inclusion in the re-
tail sales tax base, many other types—particularly those provided by 
large law firms to business clients—are more appropriately charac-
terized as business inputs. For example, when an entrepreneur seeks 
the advice of an attorney regarding which type of legal entity to use 
for a new business, the legal fees paid to the attorney constitute a 
business input and thus, at least in theory, should be excluded from 
the base of retail sales tax. By contrast, when an individual engages 
a lawyer for some non-business related legal advice, the retail sales 
tax should apply.87 
 Politically, however, it is difficult to justify excluding from the tax 
base services consumed by businesses while taxing services con-
sumed by households. As was the case with the Florida experiment 
with taxing services in 1988, one would expect legislative pressure to 
develop for extending the sales tax to business services. After all, the 
argument might go, aren’t these businesses consuming services? Why 
should “special exemptions” be granted for corporations and other 
businesses when they purchase services, but not for the elderly cou-
ple who hires a lawyer to devise a living trust? One of the reasons 
that arguments such as these have so much traction is that it is not 
obvious from the design of the retail sales tax that it should not apply 
to business inputs. Again, this problem may be traced to the design 
of the retail sales tax as a transactions-based tax. Because the tax 
applies at the point of purchase, there is a natural instinct to want to 
extend the tax to all transactions, both business and nonbusiness. 
But of course taxing all sales, including business-to-business sales, is 
exactly contrary to the theory of the tax as a tax on household con-
sumption. The extension of the tax base to services only intensifies 
the temptation to have the tax base include transactions properly ex-
cluded under the sale-for-resale concept. 
V.   IN SEARCH OF A STATE-LEVEL HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION TAX 
 As I have argued above, while the instinct to extend the sales tax 
to services is understandable, there are reasons to believe that this 
                                                                                                                    
 86. Siegfried & Smith, supra note 62, at 45. 
 87. Legal services that should be taxed under an “ideal” or “pure” retail sales tax 
would be any services consumed by households. Examples include the cost of hiring a law-
yer to draft a will, to negotiate the purchase of a home, to defend against a lawsuit arising 
from a car accident, etc. 
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reform would exacerbate many of the existing flaws of the retail sales 
tax. My analysis has focused on three significant disadvantages of 
taxing services. 
 First, because sales taxes are nondeductible, it makes little sense 
for a state to raise revenue by expanding the base of its sales tax. 
From the narrow self-interested perspective of a state’s residents, a 
better approach would be to use some revenue instrument where the 
federal government shares in the cost. Second, from a fairness 
perspective, it seems unlikely that extending the sales tax to services 
would do much, if anything, to mitigate the regressive effects of the 
sales tax. In particular, because of the low likelihood that the retail 
sales tax will ever be extended to certain services consumed by high-
income households, such as higher education and foreign travel, the 
increased progressivity that many hope will come from taxing ser-
vices is cloudy at best. Third, there has always been a temptation for 
states to extend the sales tax base to business inputs, which runs 
counter to the idea of the retail sales tax as a tax on household con-
sumption. Because so many services are consumed by businesses 
rather than households, extending the sales tax to services is likely 
to exacerbate this problem.88 For all of these reasons, states inter-
ested in raising additional revenue would do better to consider using 
alternative revenue sources, such as income or property taxes. 
 Of course, states may simply want to tax consumption or may be 
legally restrained in their ability to resort to income or property 
taxes. In those cases, there are alternative consumption taxes that 
deserve serious consideration as a replacement for the existing retail 
sales tax. Most notably, states may wish to consider consumption 
taxes such as the cash flow consumption tax (or “consumed income 
tax”),89 the Hall-Rabushka “flat tax,” or David Bradford’s “X-tax.”90 In 
the context of federal tax reform, these proposals have been the sub-
ject of considerable debate and discussion.91 With regard to state and 
local tax reform, however, very little commentary has been devoted 
                                                                                                                    
 88. It is also worth mentioning the significant new administrative burdens involved 
in taxing services, especially with regard to multistate transactions. This point is discussed 
at some length in the existing literature on the extension of the sales tax to services. See, 
e.g., William F. Fox, Sales Taxation of Services: Has Its Time Come?, in SALES TAXATION: 
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 51, 58-60 (1992). 
 89. There is an extensive literature on the cash-flow consumption tax, much of it flow-
ing from Bill Andrews’ 1974 article on the subject. See William D. Andrews, A Consump-
tion-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974). 
 90. David F. Bradford, What are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 TAX 
NOTES 383 (1988). 
 91. For a recent overview of these debates, see John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consump-
tion Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy 
Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2095 (2000). 
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to the possibility of designing any sort of consumption tax base as an 
alternative to the retail sales tax.92 
 In this Part, I briefly consider these alternative consumption 
taxes as possible replacements for the retail sales tax. The principal 
argument here is that these alternative taxes do a better job of reach-
ing household consumption than the retail sales tax. Importantly, 
however, these taxes face certain legal and political obstacles that 
must be overcome before they can be seriously considered. 
A.   Alternative Household Consumption Taxes 
 As suggested above, many of the most fundamental shortcomings 
of the retail sales tax are traceable to the design of the tax as a point-
of-purchase transactions tax. Yet importantly, consumption taxes 
need not take this form. There are several other types of consump-
tion taxes that states could use instead. The value-added tax, which 
is among the most widely used taxes in the world, is perhaps the 
most obvious option.93 In fact, there is some precedent for a state-
level value-added tax in the United States. The State of Michigan’s 
“business activity tax” may be viewed as a type of value-added tax.94 
Like the retail sales tax, however, the value-added tax offers limited 
flexibility in terms of allowing adjustments to alter the distributional 
effect of the tax.95 
 By contrast, consumption taxes imposed directly on households do 
not suffer from this problem and may be imposed at flat, regressive 
or progressive marginal rates, depending upon the political prefer-
ences of the state legislature. Two such taxes will be mentioned here: 
(1) the cash-flow consumption tax, and (2) the Hall-Rabushka “flat 
tax” or David Bradford’s “X-tax.”96 Like the retail sales tax and the 
value-added tax, these taxes are consumption taxes in the sense that 
they would completely exempt from tax the yield to capital. However, 
they differ from the retail sales tax in that the tax is not collected at 
                                                                                                                    
 92. GEORGE R. ZODROW, STATE SALES AND INCOME TAXES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 87 
(1999) (noting the lack of analysis in discussions of state/local tax reform of alternative 
consumption tax proposals). 
 93. For a discussion of value-added taxes, see Gilbert Metcalf, Value-Added Taxation: 
A Tax Whose Time Has Come?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 121 (1995). 
 94. See Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 366-368 (1990) 
(providing a useful description of the Michigan business activity tax). 
 95. In countries that use the value-added tax, it is common to impose multiple rates 
depending on the type of commodities. For example, food and other basic necessities are of-
ten “zero-rated” so as to mitigate the regressivity of the tax. For a discussion, see U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, 3 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
VALUE-ADDED TAX (1984). 
 96. Each of these taxes includes two components: a business tax designed along the 
lines of a value-added tax and an individual tax imposed upon a modified income tax base 
defined to exclude the yield to capital. My analysis here focuses on the individual tax com-
ponent of these proposals. 
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the moment of the consumption transaction. Rather, the tax is im-
posed upon a modified income tax base that is defined to exclude all 
nonconsumption uses of income. 
 To clarify this point, consider the following accounting identity: 
Income = Consumption + Savings. Put differently, income can be put 
to two possible uses: it can be saved or it can be spent. Therefore, an 
income tax that excludes savings from the tax base may be viewed as 
a consumption tax. The cash-flow consumption tax relies on this con-
ceptual framework directly by simply taxing income, but allowing a 
comprehensive deduction for savings.97 This is sometimes referred to 
as the “cash-flow” or “consumed income” approach to taxing con-
sumption. The Hall-Rabushka “flat tax” and David Bradford’s “X-tax” 
accomplish the same result of taxing only consumption, but they do 
so by exempting from tax the yield to capital.98 This is sometimes 
called the “yield exemption” approach. Because the yield exemption 
method exempts from tax all income from capital, the tax base for 
both the Hall-Rabushka tax and the X-tax consists only of wages.99 
 There has been some limited discussion of these types of taxes as 
potential candidates for state and local governments. For example, 
economist Hal Varian has proposed junking the sales tax altogether 
and moving to a consumed income tax, along the lines of the first 
consumption tax discussed above.100 In addition, economist George 
Zodrow has proposed what he calls a “Simplified Alternative Tax,” 
(SAT) which appears to be based primarily on the “flat tax” proposal 
of economists Hall and Rabushka.101 In keeping with the idea of tax-
ing consumption and only consumption, Zodrow’s SAT would tax 
                                                                                                                    
 97. The parallel in current federal tax law is the so-called “regular IRA” where indi-
viduals are allowed a deduction of up to $3,000 for amounts set aside into an Individual 
Retirement Account. I.R.C. § 219(a) (2000). 401(k) and 403(b) plans have the same treat-
ment, except that amounts deposited into those accounts are simply not taxed, rather than 
being taxed and then allowing a deduction. Id. §§ 401(k), 403(b). In both cases, the tax-
payer is not taxed on amounts that (s)he sets aside into the qualified account. 
 98. The analogy in current federal tax law is the Roth IRA, where no deduction is al-
lowed for contributions, but all income and distributions are tax-free. See I.R.C. § 408A. 
 99. For a useful discussion of the equivalence of consumption taxes and wage taxes, 
see Alvin Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 938-941. (1975). 
 100. Hal Varian, A Proposal to Eliminate Sales and Use Taxes, at 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/tax-proposal.txt (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) 
(“[S]tates could offer taxpayers a deduction for their measured savings. Since consumption 
expenditure is, by definition, income minus savings, this would be essentially equivalent to 
a very broad-based sales tax.”). At the federal level, the consumed income tax has been the 
subject of considerable interest among academics and policymakers alike. Indeed, Senators 
Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici introduced legislation in 1995 that contained a concrete 
proposal for such a consumption tax in the form of their “Unlimited Savings Allowance” 
tax proposal (USA tax). 
 101. See ZODROW, supra note 92, at 80-98. 
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wages, salaries and pension receipts, but it would not tax items such 
as interest, dividends and capital gains.102 
B.   Advantages of a Household Consumption Tax 
 These alternative consumption taxes have a distinct advantage 
over the retail sales tax in terms of reaching a broader range of 
household consumption. For example, consider the effects of the 
cash-flow consumption tax. Because it taxes all of a taxpayer’s cash 
in-flows less those amounts that are saved, the tax by definition ap-
plies to all household consumption. There is no distinction between 
goods and services, tangible versus intangible property, in-state or 
out-of-state consumption. All residents are taxed on all consumption, 
regardless of the nature of that consumption and no matter where 
that consumption takes place. 
 These alternative consumption taxes also have an edge over the 
retail sales tax in terms of giving legislators the flexibility to manipu-
late the distributional effect of the tax. As noted above, the only 
means of adjusting the distributional burden of the retail sales tax is 
by manipulating the tax base. Because of the lack of flexibility in ad-
justing tax rates, a legislator desiring greater progressivity must 
make certain guesses about the composition of household budgets at 
different income levels. For example, one common way of introducing 
more progressivity into the retail sales tax is to exempt certain com-
modities, such as food and medicine. But this approach has signifi-
cant costs. Because the tax applies at the point of purchase, when 
nothing is known about the purchaser, these exemptions apply to all 
taxpayers, regardless of their income levels. Moreover, the line draw-
ing involved in defining tax-exempt food or medicine can get compli-
cated, even ridiculous. In some states, for example, there is a crucial 
difference between large marshmallows (which are taxable) and 
small marshmallows (which are exempt).103 
 The cash-flow and yield-exemption taxes avoid these problems by 
allowing distributional adjustments to be made directly through the 
rate structure. Thus, for example, a state that adopts the yield-
exemption approach to taxing consumption can structure the tax 
rates however it wants to. On this point, it is important to note that 
even the so-called “flat tax” is not really flat.104 Because it includes a 
zero-bracket amount, the flat-tax is better described as relying on a 
                                                                                                                    
 102. Id. 
 103. See Howard Gleckman, The Tempest Over Taxes, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 7, 2000, 
at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_06/b3667031.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (on 
file with author). 
 104. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between 
Rate and Base, 85 TAX NOTES 1177, 1180 (1999) (describing dual-rate structure of Hall-
Rabushka flat tax). 
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two-bracket rate structure. And of course there is no reason why leg-
islators should be limited to just two brackets. David Bradford has 
emphasized this point in his discussion of the X-tax, which can be ad-
justed to accommodate as much rate progressivity as legislators pre-
fer.105 For present purposes, the point is not to endorse one particular 
rate structure over any other, but rather to highlight the advantage 
of any system that allows legislators to implement its distributional 
preferences through rate adjustments rather than through manipu-
lations of the tax base. 
 Finally, some mention should be made of the treatment of a cash-
flow consumption tax or a yield-exemption type tax for purposes of 
the federal income tax deduction for state and local taxes. Because of 
the repeal of the deduction for sales taxes in 1986, there may be some 
question as to whether these alternative consumption taxes would be 
deductible under current law. Despite the fact that these taxes are 
designed as consumption taxes, there are reasons to believe that they 
would be deductible as income taxes under section 164(a)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. First, under current law, it is clear that pure 
“wage taxes” are deductible as state income taxes.106 Because these 
taxes, especially the yield-exemption tax, are fundamentally wage 
taxes, there is every reason to believe that this authority would apply 
to them. Second, the federal income tax itself has many features of a 
cash-flow consumption and a yield-exempt tax, and Congress contin-
ues to label it an “income tax.” This would also suggest that section 
164(a)(3) should be interpreted to allow a deduction for these alter-
native consumption taxes. 
 In summary, then, both the cash-flow consumption tax and the 
yield-exemption type consumption tax are superior to the retail sales 
tax in several ways. First, these taxes capture more precisely a base 
of “household consumption,” which is presumably what the sales tax 
is, very imperfectly, trying to do. Second, the distributional effects of 
these taxes may be adjusted more easily—through changes to the 
rate structure, rather than through modifications of the tax base. 
And third, these taxes would likely be deductible for federal income 
tax purposes for the reasons indicated above. 
C.   Political and Legal Obstacles 
 Despite these considerable benefits, there are significant obstacles 
standing in the way of enactment of the cash-flow or yield-exempt 
consumption taxes at the state and local level anytime soon. Of 
course, any significant change in the tax structure will generate po-
                                                                                                                    
 105. Bradford, supra note 90, at 384-85. 
 106. See Trujillo v. Comm’r, 68 TC 670 (1977); see also Rev. Rul. 89-16, 1989-1 CB 76 
(1989). 
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litical opposition among those who stand to lose. Yet the opposition to 
the adoption of a cash-flow or yield-exempt consumption tax is likely 
to be particularly intense, especially in those states with a history of 
a grassroots tax resistance movement. The reason is that these taxes 
impose a direct burden on households, whereas much of the burden 
of the retail sales tax is indirect because of the tax’s failure to exempt 
all business inputs. Moreover, to the extent that either of these taxes 
is imposed on the basis of one’s state residence, they would necessar-
ily reduce the opportunities for exporting the tax burden to nonresi-
dents.107 
 Finally, in states without an income tax, there is the additional 
difficulty that the cash-flow or yield-exempt consumption taxes may 
be viewed as a type of “income” tax and thus subject to the same po-
litical and legal difficulties that income taxes face in those states.108 
Indeed, in certain states “income” taxes are constitutionally off-
limits. For example, the Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o tax . 
. . upon the income of natural persons who are residents or citizens of 
the state shall be levied by the state.”109 Opponents might argue that 
the cash-flow and yield-exempt consumption taxes constitute an “in-
come tax” within the meaning of that provision.110 Of course, to the 
extent that these taxes are fundamentally equivalent to a retail sales 
tax, the implication of this argument would be the retail sales tax is 
itself a type of income tax as well. The problem with the sharp dis-
tinction in Florida constitutional law between sales and income taxes 
is that, at least with regard to taxing consumption, the two taxes are 
fundamentally the same. As is widely recognized in the tax policy lit-
erature on the question, the only difference between the two concerns 
the treatment of the yield to capital. For better or for worse, this sort 
of academic theorizing has traditionally failed to exert a significant 
influence on tax policy outcomes. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Where does this leave us? At a minimum, the analysis above sug-
gests that states should give more serious consideration to alterna-
tive forms of consumption taxes. While there may be some political 
and legal difficulties associated with these alternatives, there are 
                                                                                                                    
 107. Of course, there is no reason to assume that specific excise taxes on tourist-related 
goods and services, such as hotel taxes and taxes on car rentals, should not be continued. 
 108. States without an income tax include Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. See HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 20-3. 
 109. FLA. CONST., art. VII, § 5. 
 110. The trick, of course, is to maneuver the law in such a way as to have the tax not 
be considered an “income” tax for state constitutional law purposes but to have it viewed as 
an “income” tax for purposes of the federal income tax deduction under section 164(a)(3). 
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also persuasive reasons to think that this kind of wholesale reform of 
state consumption taxes is a superior course of action as compared to 
simply continuing to tinker with the retail sales tax. Moreover, 
thinking about alternative consumption taxes (and why they may 
face political opposition) forces us to reexamine what we really want 
out of the retail sales tax. For example, to the extent that opposition 
to a state-level cash-flow consumption tax is grounded in the fact 
that it imposes too direct a burden on too broad a base of household 
consumption, that may speak to the question of whether we should 
be attempting to reform the retail sales tax to bring it more into line 
with a broad-based household consumption. 
 In the end, voters may simply prefer—perhaps even strongly pre-
fer—an inefficient and regressive point-of-purchase sales tax to the 
sort of broad-based consumption tax outlined above. Resistance to re-
form may simply be further evidence for the old aphorism that “an 
old tax is a good tax.” Still, there are good reasons to consider new 
and more efficient forms of taxing consumption at the state and local 
level. As the economy continues its shift from goods to services and 
as electronic commerce continues to grow, we will eventually outgrow 
the old-style, Depression-era retail sales tax. The time to consider al-
ternatives is now, if only because someday this particular old tax 
may become a dead tax. 
